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Description: African Defense is the most widely distributed defense publication focused on the African military and government security professional.

AfricAn Defense Dedicated to the African Military Professional Promoting strength and security through professionalism and partnership April May 2015 Combating Piracy in Gulf of Guinea Tow a Co ards mm on Afri Spac can e Po licy Botswana Defence Force South Africa s Defense Spending African Defense is privately published six-times per year by Defense House Publishing. Copyright 2015. All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced duplicated copied or retransmitted by any means without the expressed written permission of the publisher. The views expressed in African Defense are those of the authors unless otherwise stated and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of African Defense or its staff Subscriptions One year (8 issues) subscriptions USA & Africa Mexico Canada Europe Rest of the world 64.00 75.00 90.00 95.00 All rates are in U.S funds. Bank drafts must be drawn on U.S banks. Visa and MasterCard accepted. AfricAn Defense 4 April May 2015 Keep the Wheels Turning Runflat inserts and non-pneumatic tires can minimize mobility kills and keep vehicles moving. 11 Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Fast-tracking multinational efforts that coordinate maritime security for the region. By Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo African Defense Staff Publisher & CEO Jeff McKaughan jeffm 443-243-1710 Publisher Africa Helmoed Heitman helmoedh Director of Publications Samuel Anders samuela Art Director art 14 16 18 20 23 Considering the advantages and synergies of focused acquisition. By Paul Pryce The African Standardization Challenge African Space Policy and Strategy Building on existing frameworks and new initiatives Africa moves towards a common strategy. By Ayman Ahmed Global Advertising Jeff McKaughan jeffm 443-243-1710 Growing Challenges of Peace and Security in Africa West Africa is a complex mix of factors that impact politics security and personal relationships. By Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas African Defense P.O.Box 236 Forest Hill MD 21050 USA African Defense P.O. Box 3638 Cape Town 8000 South Africa South African Defense Budget 2015...and Beyond It could take five years or more to recover from the dismal state of the SANDF s funding problem. By Dev Mehta OMM COVER During an international training exercise in the Gulf of Guinea a boarding party gains access to a ship. Photo by DoD Can the Botswana Defence Force Attain its Effectiveness Posture A critical look at the military effectiveness levels the BDF has established for itself. What will it take to get there By Colonel Sianang Mokuedi Fast-tracking multinational efforts that coordinate maritime security for the region. The 5 000 nautical mile (nmi) coastline of the wider Gulf of Guinea offers seemingly idyllic conditions for shipping. It is host to numerous natural harbors and is largely devoid of chokepoints and extreme weather conditions. Itisalsorichinhydrocarbons fishand other resources. These attributes provide immense potential for maritime commerce resource extraction shipping and development.Indeed containertrafficinWest African ports has grown 14 percent annually since 1995 the fastest of any region in SubSaharan Africa. The wider Gulf of Guinea stretching from Cape Verde to Angola is the main transit hub and facilitator to the region s rapid economic growth which has averaged 7 percent since 2012. The Gulf of Guinea has also become a hub for global energy supplieswithsignificantquantitiesofall petroleum products consumed in Europe North America and Asia transiting this waterway. This economic boom however is threatened. In 2012 the Gulf of Guinea surpassed that of the Gulf of Aden (infamous for high-seas hijackings) as the region with the highest number of reported piracy attacks in the world. These attacks also tended to be more violent. Given the limited maritimesecuritypresenceofftheWestAfrican coast SouthAmericannarcoticstraffickers have found the region an attractive transit route to Europe. Oil theft and illegal bunkering plague the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria alone loses between 40 000 and 100 000 barrelsadayduetotheft.With40percent of the region s annual catch estimated to be illegal unregulated orunreported West Africa s waters also endure the highest level ofillegalfishingintheworld. Trade partners have taken note. In 2013 almost all of the estimated 10.2 billion worth of regional trade with the United Kingdom moving through the Gulf of Guinea was declared at risk of theft. Withtheincreaseinrisktoships cargoand seafarers insurance premiums have soared and companies have taken on additional burdens to secure their ships. InsufficientstatepresenceintheGulfof Guinea makes the economic losses incurred bytheregiondifficulttoestimatewith precision. These are certainly substantial however. Estimates of the annual cost of piracy to the Gulf of Guinea range from 565 million to 2 billion. The strategic development plans of many countries in the region rely on 60 percent of their revenues coming from hydrocarbon resources either sourced from or transiting through the Gulf. Governments in the region have been late to realize how their absence in the maritime domain not only costs them untold revenue but also undermines security on land as criminal activities on the sea start and end onshore. To the extent that the global economy relies on increasingly interdependent shipping and energy supply networks the maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea constitute a collective challenge to all stakeholders in the region and internationally. zxxxx The Unique Nature of the Gulf of Guinea s Maritime Insecurity Piracy attacks (and armed robbery at ses)intheGulfofGuineacomprisedafifth of all recorded maritime incidents globallyin2013.Thesefiguresrepresentonlya fraction of the actual attacks in the region as ship owners and governments downplay incidents to avoid increased shipping costs or a reputation for insecurity. Incidents reported to the International Maritime Bureau indicate that the affected area is substantial. Anchorages and approaches to the ports of Bonny and Lagos (Nigeria) Cotonou (Benin) Lom (Togo) Tema (Ghana) and Abidjan (C te d Ivoire) are particularly vulnerable with large numbers of merchant ships often loitering in these areas. In the busy port of Lagos hundreds of vessels loiter for days along the roadsteads (calm areas of water near harbors where ships can anchor) due to the limited capacityofWestandCentralAfricanports foroffloading.Controlmeasuresintheap- Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea By Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo 4 African Defense April May 2015 proaches to these ports remain weak. The beaching of 25 ships on the Lagos coast following a rough two-hour storm in 2010 revealed that many vessels in harbors are unmanned and unmonitored. The then director-general of the Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) suggested that such boats may also serve as hideouts and blinds for pirates and robbers. Whenavesselisboardedbypirates equipmentandcargoareoftenstolen. Occasionally members of the crew are kidnapped for ransom. Ships may be hijacked and sailed to distant locations across maritime borders where cargo is transferred to other vessels. Recent attacks in the Gulf of Guinea indicate a preference for ships laden with crude oil and oil products. Such attacks are known to have occurred along the Ghana-to-Angola and Nigeria-to-C te d Ivoire axes. For example the MT Kerala was found in waters near Ghana s Tema Port on January 28 2014 with a sizable amount of her oil cargo missing after being seized near Luanda eight days earlier. In other cases support vessels to offshore installations are attacked sometimes with such speed and precision as to raise suspicion of complicity of the offshore crews in the theft and illicit sale of oil. Gulf of Guinea piracy is increasingly characterized by violent assaults against vessels and hostage takings--1 871 seafarers were victims of attacks and 279 were taken hostagein2013.Incidentsoffierceresistance to naval patrols have also increased. Pirates aboardapassengerboatopenedfireona Nigerian Navy (NN) craft during a routine patrol along the Cameroonian border in August 2013. Six pirates were killed in the exchange. In another incident just weeks prior piratestriedtofleethegasolinetankerMT Notre after eight NN vessels surrounded it. Twelve of the 16 pirates were killed and their boat sank during the 30-minute gun battle. In April 2013 two crew members were killed after pirates boarded the SP Brussels off Nigeria s coast. Just 18 months earlier fivecrewweretakenhostagewhen pirates robbed the same vessel while it was 40 miles off the coast of the Niger Delta. Oil theft is often the result of collusion among local gangs compromised elements in the oil industry and security agencies and organized criminal networks from EasternEuropeandAsia.WhileNigerian nationals have been most involved in the region s piracy other Africans Eastern Europeans and Filipinos have been arrested in Gulf waters for crude-oil theft illegal bunkering and attacks on shipping. In March 2014 two Britons employees of a UK-based maritimesecurityfirm werearrestedwith 12Nigeriansforattemptingtooffloadcrude from a vessel that itself had been seized for stealing oil. zxxxx Building a Collective Maritime Security Response Attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Guinea have exposed the vulnerability of the region s maritime space. This has precipitated various countermeasures. In 2010 improvements in operational collaboration between the NN and NIMASA resulted in substantial reductions in attacks around Lagos Harbor. Under the collaboration jointly manned vessels conduct law enforcement and antipiracy patrols backed with electronic surveillance assets particularly within the territorial seas and harbor approaches. Unfortunately the gains in Nigeria led to increased attacks off the coast of neighboring Benin. After reporting no attacks in 2009 and only 1 in 2010 Benin experienced a surge of more than 20 incidents in 2011. As a result tonnage at Cotonou Port fell by more than 15 percent resulting in a loss of 81 million in customs revenue. The development compelled Benin s President BoniYayitorequestassistancefromNigeria. In September 2011 NN-NIMASA vessels began jointly patrolling waters with Beninese security forces. The number of actual and attempted attacks on ships around Cotonou Port dropped from 20 in 2011 to 2 in2012and0in2013.Consequently shipping activities resurged. Reflectingtheinterconnectednature of this threat enhanced patrolling around Cotonou led to a sharp increase in attacks in 2012 on shipping and hostage taking off the neighboring coasts of Togo (attacks 15 hostages 79) and again Nigeria (attacks 27 hostages 61). Over 80 percent of the attacks recorded in Nigeria occurred in waters off the Niger Delta where the NN-NIMASA collaboration was less robust. Notably Togo and Nigeria accounted for over 70 percent oftheattacksandhostagetakinginWest Africa in 2012-2014. In May 2013 two private maritime securityfirmscollaboratedwiththeNNto launch the Secure Anchorage Area (SAA) which provides security to vessels in a designated area off Lagos Port. The SAA offers armed protection for vessels wishing to either anchor or conduct ship-to- African Defense April May 2015 5 ship transfer operations offshore. In 2014 NIMASA in collaboration with the NN and the Nigerian Air Force unveiled their Satellite Surveillance Centre (SSC). The SSC tracks all vessels in Nigerian waters and can identify each vessel s International Maritime Organization (IMO) number. This initiative complements the existing array of sensors installed along Nigeria s coastline under the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability program supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. Various other regional and international partners also adopted supportive resolutions and programs including the African Union United Nations European Union IMO and G8. In the meantime drawing on lessons learned from the Gulf of Aden the shipping industry created the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea(MTISC-GOG).Withthegoalofbecoming a dedicated focal point for incident reporting information sharing and the latest maritime security guidance the MTISCGOG was tested in 2013 and 2014 during the regional maritime exercise Obangame Express.TheMTISC-GOGisheadquartered at the Regional Maritime University in Accra Ghana and provides participating vessels with 24-hour-per-day security reportage. It can also provide information to national maritime operational centers in the region and Interpol. In response to the growing maritime threat the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) developed an Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security (ISMS) in 2008 which called for a common regional framework for regulating maritime activities off Central Africa. In 2009 it activated the Regional Coordination Center for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe-Noire Republic of Congo. Under the ISMS CRESMAC is responsible for commanding three centers for multinational coordination (CMCs) one for each Platform Profile of West African Navies and Coast Guards Small Craft Acquisition in 10 years Large Craft Acquisition in 15 years Small Patrol Craft (IPC SDB) Benin Cabo Verde C te d Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Nigeria 65 530 281 43 292 173 189 360 459 2 7 2 3 1 2 7 4 3 10 8 9 4 2 2 10 15 1 6 4 3 2 25 4 7 Senegal Sierra Leone Togo 6 286 217 30 3 8 4 4 3 1 9 4 2 China France China Germany US France US UK US Germany US Portugal US France Germany US Italy UK Singapore China Israel Nigeria Netherlands France Spain China US France US zone of Central African waters Zones A B and D. The primary value of this initiative is to bridge information sharing and authorizationprotocolsrequiredinthepursuitof suspect vessels across maritime boundaries. The CMC for Zone D operational since 2009 coordinates antipiracy efforts by the naviesofCameroon EquatorialGuinea Gabon and S o Tom and Pr ncipe. This collaboration has resulted in a reduction in maritime crime and hostage taking as well asover17citationsforillegalfishingthat resultedinheftyfinesinCameroonalone. There is an ongoing effort to consummate anEconomicCommunityofWestAfrican States(ECOWAS)IntegratedMaritimeStrategy (EIMS) modeled after the ECCAS effort including creating a regional coordination centerformaritimesecurityinWestAfrica and three zones (E F and G) overseen by multinational maritime coordination centers (MMCCs).ThepilotfortheseisECOWAS Zone E (the waters off Benin Nigeria and Togo). The reality of a constantly shifting threat informed the Yaound Declaration of June 2013 in which the heads of governmentfromECOWASandECCASagreed to establish a Maritime Inter-Regional Coordination Center (MICC) in Yaound Cameroon. A Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity inWestandCentralAfrica wasadopted to further promote collective efforts on information sharing interdiction prosecution and support to victims. Implementation of the nonbinding code of conduct has been slow going however. In particular the delayed operationalization of the MICC highlights the need for greater political will. zxxxx Continuing Challenges The highly adaptive nature of piracy networks in the Gulf of Guinea mirrors the situation in the Gulf of Aden whereby the gains of the multinational antipiracy effort off the coast of Somalia mutated into expanded threats elsewhere in the Arabian SeaandIndianOcean.Whilesingle-state solutions may achieve short-term gains they areinsufficienttocurtailthefluidstrategies adopted by piracy networks. Accordingly a strategy of concentrating only on transitvulnerabilitiesisinsufficientaspirates will constantly adapt to circumvent naval countermeasures. The more fundamental issues of how to manage maritime space Maritime Patrol Aircraft Source of Acquisition Large Patrol Boats Coastline (nmil) Landing Craft Corvette Country Frigate African Defense April May 2015 and to counter what motivates pirates and their support structures on land must also be addressed. Continental causalities. Man lives onlandandnotatsea.WhiletheGulfof Guinea provides an ideal shipping and fishingvenue theeasewithwhichrobbers can disappear along the coastline after an attack exposes another less favorable aspect about the region--limitations of surveillance intelligence and community policing in the coastal areas. In particular political and socioeconomic conditions onshore especially the growing army of jobless youth are drivers of piracy in the region. In the Niger Delta for instance the government s amnesty program for ex-militants in 2009 caused an immediate abatement in attacks on shipping. The resurgence in 2013 has been attributed partly to challenges in sustaining gainful employment opportunities to growing numbers of youth in the area. Governmentsareequallyobligatedto pursue more effective enforcement ac- tions against piracy networks on land. For example the illicit markets where pirated goods (especially oil) are sold around the world remain largely unimpeded. Capacity. Operationalizing political interagency and interstate commitments to combat piracy and related crimes in waters of the Gulf of Guinea will depend on establishing robust capacity for surveillance response and enforcement. Surveillance. Benin Ghana Liberia Nigeria and Senegal have improved their coastal surveillance assets with the assistance of partners such as the United States and the EU. Unfortunately the ability to detect vessels without active automatic independent surveillance (AIS) beyond radar range (30-40 nmi) remains a challenge for many states in the region. Similarly access to affordable broadband and local maintenance capacity to facilitate communication and patrols presents a problem for many states. Response.CentralandWestAfrican navies and coast guards have limited patrol capacity. Even if the entire current inventory of platforms were deployed there still would not be enough vessels to provide for a sustained patrol of one craft for every 250 nmi of coastline. The varietyofequipmentsuppliersposes additional challenges of interoperability andsustainabilityoffleetvessels the majority of which are over 25 years old. Nonetheless maintaining the availability of these vessels is vital. At the beginning of 2014 the Nigerian government announced a 60 percent drop in crudeoil theft (from 100 000 to about 40 000 barrels a day) due to among other things thedeploymentofnewlyacquiredpatrol boats at strategic access routes in the waters of the Niger Delta. Additions such as fast inshore patrol craft and seaward defense boats (SDBs) including ex-US Coast Guard cutters were notable in this regard. Sustaining such modest success requiressignificantbolsteringofpatrolin- 2015 Advancing Africa s defence and security objectives through interoperability 6 8 July 2015 Pretoria South Africa Land Forces Africa is the meeting place for senior military officials government defence industry representatives and agencies involved in security and emergency response. Keynote speakers include Ms Nosiviwe Noluthando Mapisa-Nqakula Minister of Defence and Military Veterans of the Republic of South Africa Lieutenant General Paul Mella Force Commander of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Major General Richard Opoku-Adusei Chief of Army Staff Ghana Armed Forces Colonel Theo Ligthelm Senior Staff Officer Strategy & Planning Office of the Surgeon General South African Medical Health Service Topics to be discussed include African Union Peacekeeping counter insurgency border security disaster management and technology Gain knowledge from experts with first-hand experience in African conflicts Learn how to train and operate a military force effectively Develop cross border security partnerships See the latest military and disaster management technologies 100 complimentary delegate passes available for serving military register by visiting or call Taryn van Zanten on 27 12 997 2552 Visit for the latest event updates and programme African Defense April May 2015 7 ventory with more offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and coastal patrol boats. Enforcement. Frustration over the lack of effective prosecution of pirates and maritime criminals is prevalent in manyCentralandWestAfricanstates. Thisstemsfromanabsenceofrequisite domestic laws for prosecuting piracy and in other instances weak penalties and judicial processes. In many states navies coast guards and maritime security agencies lack prosecution powers and rely on the police and other agencies for such a vital element of the enforcement cycle. In the restive Niger Delta for example trial for many suspects of oil theft and piracy comes several months after arrest due toinsufficientavailabilityofjudicialofficers.Duringthattime challengesinthe preservation of evidence and limitations of detention periods often weigh in favor of the suspects who regain freedom soon after arrest. Commercialization of antipiracy efforts. The increase in attacks to shipping in the Gulf of Guinea has prompted various commercial countermeasures. In Nigeria oil companies have hired private military and security contractors (PMSCs) to provide protected transit in the waters off the Niger Delta. The exponential rise in the number of PMSCs in recent years demonstrates the lucrativeness of such ventures. The engagement of PMSCs by NIMASA and the government of Togo to guard ports moreover underscores the expanding opportunities for PMSCs in the region. Theprofit-orientedfocusofPMSCs however introducesfundamentalquestions oversovereignty equity andgovernance imperatives.Whathappenstosuchprofitoriented ventures when the piracy threat abates Willsuchoutfitsdirectsufficient attention to the onshore networks and drivers of piracy including tracking the products and proceeds of such criminal activities A scenario whereby PMSCs own more patrol vessels than navies or coast guards raises questionsoverrolesandresponsibilitiesfor national security. A concerted effort among the IMO the regional bodies and national governmentsmustaddressthesequestions beforeinevitableconflictsofinterestand conspiracy theories build up. zxxxx Way Forward Combating piracy and armed attacks onshippingintheGulfofGuinearequires more effective measures across the piracy cycle from shore-based causes and offshore transit vulnerabilities to shore-based markets for piracy proceeds. Stemming the tide of attacksequallydemandsmoredeliberate cross-cutting efforts that incorporate preventive deterrent and collaborative measures among national and regional stakeholders. Maritime space management. Improving security is more about the strategic management of maritime space than it is about navalfleetsandpatrolcraft.CentralandWest Africanstatesmustdefineclearertransit corridors and anchorage sites for protection of merchant vessels in their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones which extend 200 nmi from a country s coast. This would be akin to the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor that has functioned well in the Gulf of Aden and has been replicated as a voluntary reporting area in the Gulf of Guinea by the MTISC-GOG. Sucharrangementsrequireacombination of regional and national collaboration that the proposed MICC could facilitate. Further to the protected secured anchorage area in Lagos harbor similar concepts should be established around approaches to all ports in the region including enforcement and sanction processes for vessel violations. Such procedures will improve vessel safety as well as simplify the patrol and surveillance demands on maritime authorities. Estimates are that effective maritime domain awareness capability in the area can be realized and sustained at a reasonable cost. To advance regional maritime space management there is a need to fast-track the activation process of the MICC and the pilot Zone E mechanisms. This will facilitate information sharing among law enforcement agencies maritime commerce stakeholders and international partners. In particular the establishment of national maritime operation centers (MOCs) couldresolvesomedifficultiesininteragency cooperation among navies and port and flagstatecontrolauthorities. Enforcement harmonization. The limited number of piracy-related trials underscores the need for greater harmonization of legal efforts in the region as stated in the memorandum of understanding between ECCAS ECOWASandtheGulfofGuinea Commission. To do so a review of each country s legal framework should be undertaken to enable each to effectively prosecute piracy. Efforts to fast-track extraditions and to synchronize penalties for crimes at sea across jurisdictions would prevent pirates fromfindingmorelenienttreatmentacross coastal boundaries. Members of the judicial system should be trained in coordination with maritime enforcement agencies in order to speed up and standardize the process of evidence collection and preservation to facilitateefficientandfairtrials.Creating courts dedicated to handling piracy and sea robbery prosecutions may help minimize these delays. 8 African Defense April May 2015 Internavy cooperation. Authorization of a standing forum for Zone E heads of naviesbytheECOWASCommitteeofChiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) could provide much-needed synergy for coordination efforts of the region s navies. This protocol needs to be replicated among other zones underECOWAS.ThePoliticalAffairs Peace andSecurityDepartmentofECOWAShas the responsibility in this regard to encourage the activation of the zonal coordination mechanisms for all member states including common understandings and prosecutions of cross-border and extraterritorial crimes. Consummation and implementation oftheECOWASIntegratedMaritimeStrategy therefore deserves the urgent attention and commitment of all stakeholders including the affected coastal communities. Asset Requirements. A layered deterrent mechanism characterized by maritime air patrols ship-borne patrols (made up of OPVs and SDBs) and terrestrial- and satellite-based surveillance assets will be needed to monitor and secure the Gulf of Guinea. A theoretical 100-nmi radar coverage and patrol radius should be assumed for each patrol vessel. For every vessel at sea one should be on standby while another would be undergoing routine maintenance. Based ontheseassumptionsandWestAfrica s approximately 3 000 nmi coast the aggregatedminimumOPVrequirementfor effective deterrence and response amounts to 90 craft. Compared to the current inventoryof32OPVs equivalentassets(frigates corvettes and large patrol craft as categorized in governments should consider the 58-OPVdeficitasaworkingguideonfuture capitalization efforts. In the relatively calm and open waters of the region OPVs of under 1 000-ton displacement with minimal weaponrywouldsuffice.SDBrequirements would enable effective presence in the approaches to all ports in the region with a similar provision that two additional SDBs be available for each one deployed. States with long coastlines or piracy hotspots shouldconsideracquisitionoffixedand rotary wing maritime patrol aircraft. These projections though ambitious provide a planning guide for governments navies foreign partners and investors. Profiling piracy networks. Breaking the cyclical chain of attacks on shipping in acost-effectivemannerrequiresarobust capacityforprofilingmaritimecrimeand sharing information among stakeholders in the region. Such a capacity would involve monitoring transiting vessels their crews andtheirownershipwithaviewtoprofiling suspicious vessels and individuals including activities in coastal communities. A watch list for suspect vessels as well as human accomplices should be developed updated and shared. An international campaign to close offmarketsandfinancialcenterstostolen oil and its proceeds would raise the cost of stealing from the Gulf of Guinea. This would requiremoreconcertedeffortsbetween CentralandWestAfricanstatesandtheir global partners to identify and sanction criminal networks involved in the laundering of proceeds from piracy and related crimes. Sanctioning vessel owners and organizationsknowntobethebeneficiaries of proceeds from attacks and oil theft would beextremelyusefulandyetisasignificant gap in the collaboration between the EU Asian and African states. Partnership Engagement. More collaboration is needed among international partners and African governments in the international waters around the Gulf of Guinea. Operations Atalanta Ocean Shield and Combined Task Force 150 151 in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean provide an adaptable template. There would also be value in the US European and Asian partners strengthening naval and coast guard capacity in the region through effective collaboration with the evolving MICC MMCC CMC and MOCs. Targeted economic development on the coast. The situation in the Niger Delta and widespread poverty in the region underscore the need for more concerted infrastructural development youth employment generation and coastal environmental protections. Given that the waters off the Niger Delta account for over half of the piracy attacks recorded in recent years there is a need to improve economic opportunities for coastal communities there. Likewise given the socioeconomic impactsofillegalfishing pollution and environmental degradation state and local governments across the region must focus on maritime-related policy matters that directly impact coastal residents. This includes enforcing laws governing foreign companies intrastate shipping proper application of environmental laws and expanding shipbuilding fishing andotherindustries wheresignificantproductiondeficiencies still exist. Such advancements would reduce the incentives that drive youth into piracy and create shared interests among communities the state and the private sector in a secure and vibrant maritime economy. Nigeria s Petroleum Industry Bill which incorporates measures aimed at deepening responsible exploitation improving local communityparticipation andbenefitting host communities with economic social and infrastructural development could also emphasize enhanced economic opportunities in coastal areas. At the very least multinational oil companies should rethink their current community development strategies. zxxxx Conclusion As countries in the Gulf of Guinea increasingly rely on the seas for economic prosperity the evolving violent attacks on shipping with transnational dimensions call for multilateral remedies. Fast-tracking initiatives such as the MICC the Zone E MMCC and other operational models already underway across the region offers acost-effectiveandquick-impactapproach toward enhancing security in the short term. WhileacknowledgingthenecessityofPMSCs as a stopgap measure there is a need for caution on the part of vessel owners governments and regional bodies against the over-commercialization of maritime security. Governments must also uproot the drivers of piracy as well as expand the resources and shared interests in a secure maritime domain. None of these recommendations will gain enough traction to be self-sustaining however until the discussion of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is raised from the operational to the ministerial level where the purse strings are held. Until there ispoliticalwillineachCentralandWestAfrican country to protect the region s waters the Gulf of Guinea will remain a challenged security space. Rear Admiral Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo is an officer in the Nigeria Navy. His three decades of experience include participation in operations and sea exercises in the Gulf of Guinea the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. He served as an expert in the development of the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050. This article was published as an Africa Security Brief by the African Center for Strategic Studies. The original version of the article complete with endnotes can be found at African Defense April May 2015 9 Keep the Wheels Turning Militaries large and small have turned to wheeled vehicles for tactical mobility. Theyofferagreatdealofflexibilityinroad and off-road travel as well as having lower operating and maintenance costs and in general are simpler to take care of when compared to a tracks. Make no mistake that in some cases it s hard to beat what a heavier tracked vehicle has to offer but in many cases wheeled vehicles get the job done. Any system--or vehicle--is only a strong as its weakest part and in many cases rubber pneumatic tires can be the chink in the armor. They are susceptible to bullets shrapnel fire--andevenjustsharp rocks and other terrain features. Runflats theinsertionofadevicewithin a tire that keeps it from going completely flatwhenpenetrated andnon-pneumatic Runflat inserts and non-pneumatic tires can minimize mobility kills and keep vehicles moving. tires off options. A number of companies have developed solutions each taking a somewhat different approach in design and or materials. zxxxx Preserving Mobility In1977Tyroninventeditsfirstspecial aluminum wheel and safety band. Intheearly1980s attherequestofthe 10 African Defense April May 2015 British Ministry of Defence Tyron produced arangeofrunflatsfromthelightweight low cost Tyron Multiband which is perfect for vehicles that have a spare wheel as the Multiband allows the driver to continue withoneormoretiresdeflatedtoaplace ofsafety totheuniquerangeofAllTerrain Rubber(ATR)runflatsforoffroadandmilitary applications which gives 50 km plus and up to 150km Since then the company has continued to develop new wheel and tire systems that have served government security and military customers. Tyron has taken the advantages of rubber and the advantages of composite anddevelopedauniquerunflatforoff roadapplicationswhichdoesnotrequire any special tools to change the tires. Our design has been patented and undergone significanttestingincludingballistictesting againstsmallarms saidTonyGlazebrook Tyron s technical director. Tyron sATRRunflatsaremultipartrubbersystemsdesignedtobeeasytofit even at the side of the road without any special tools.Theuseofrubbermakestherunflats particularly suitable for off road situations as the rubber absorbs much of the impact from crossing rough ground. Forconfidentialityreasons thecompanyisreluctanttonameanyspecificcustomers. Ourrunflatshavebeenselectedby African customers and are under evaluation byanumberofothers saidGlazebrook. WehaverecentlyintroducedFriction Shield which is designed to further improve the performance of the world s only multipiecerubberrunflat saidGlazebrook. At the heart of Friction Shield is a sealed lubrication system that bursts followingtiredeflation.Thisprovidestheright amount of lubricant to ensure that the tire is not damaged further by reducing the heat generated by friction between the insert and the inside of the tire itself this enables the vehicle to keep functioning effectively over longerdistancesandhigherspeeds. Friction Shield s lubrication system is in sealed sachets to stop it from drying out or becoming contaminated and is permanently attachedtotherunflatitself--whichalso makes it impossible to forget when changing tires. The ability to keep moving is the purposeofarunflatandhowfarisalwaysa question. TheATRrunflats unlikecomposites comes with a performance guarantee giving a maximum performance is of no interest to anyone as they will claim 50km or 75km or 100km in English this means that theycannotdothesefigures becausedoing 5kmisupto100km saidGlazebrook. For these reasons we give a minimum performance guarantee which is 50km plus on the heavy 4x4 6x6 and 8x8 vehicles on 20-inchwheels.WealsohaveTuVapproval for100kmat50km hwithtwoflattireson a Toyota Fortuner and then carried on for a further 50km at 30km h with all four tires deflated. Tyron sATRrunflatisdescribedasthe world sfirstbulletprooftwoandthree-piece steelreinforcedrubber(rubberrunflatwith steelbackbone)runflatsystemforavariety ofcombatvehicles. Itsunique flexible characteristics outperform the alternatives in bothdistanceanddurability accordingto the company. The company produces special heavy duty alloy and steel wheels in 16-inch 17inch and 18-inch for 4x4 Toyotas etc. zxxxx Resilient Technologies Founded in 2005 Resilient Technologies a wholly owned subsidiary of Polaris Industries is a developer of advanced mobility products including its patented non-pneumatic (airless) tire--TerrainArmor--for their all terrain vehicles (ATVs) and off road vehciles (ORVs). According to the company TerrainArmor is the industry s firstnon-pneumatictirebuilttosustaindamage without compromising functionality or mobility. Originallydesignedformilitary environments this polymeric web design can withstand harsh terrain that would typically destroy a pneumatic tire. It has been tested on their ATVs and ORVs with millions of miles on off-road trailsandroadwheelverification.Inthe harshest environment the tires will last for more than 5 000 miles with a full combat load the wheels have gone 1 000 miles with railroad spikes driven directly through the tire and 350 miles after being hit with .50 caliber rounds. Arunflatallowsausertocontinueto operate the vehicle system at a degraded performanceandslowerspeeds saidPaul Dutch site manager for Resilient. The TerrainArmortireactslikearunflatinthat you can continue to operate the vehicle but you lose very little speed and performance. Whileroadconditionshaveimprovedin Africa over recent years maintenance and lack of paved roadways are a constant issue both in urban and rural areas creating issuesforairfilledtires.Holes rocks debris and rough surfaces can take the air from yourpneumatictire. Our tires have been validated and continue to test off road to ensure they can handlemostoff-andon-roadobstacles explainedDutch. Wehavehadquiteabit of interest in our technology from African organizationslookingtoreduceflatsand tirereplacement. Weproducetwodifferenttires onefor ourMV850ATV(orcivilianvariantWV850) andoneforourRangerORVs saidDutch. Currently we have an 8-inch wide 26-inch diameter tire for the Ranger and are validating a 9-inch wide 26-inch diameter tire for heavier loads which will be available in the fallof2015. Thecompanyisalsoworking African Defense April May 2015 11 on several different platforms both inside and outside of the Polaris ATV ORV family. For real world testing Resilient has put 36 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition through this tire shot it with a .50 cal round and had a railroad spike completely embedded in through the tread band. In each case we were able to reach top speed (80kmph) on the vehicle and didn t notice any degradationinperformance saidDutch. The Polaris Rangers use nearly the same tire. The weight and speeds of the Ranger vary from the MV850 under similar test conditions they were able to reach maximum allowable speeds without performance loss. A damaged tire will eventually degrade over time and distance but even withsignificantdamagethetirecango hundreds if not thousands of miles. Depending on the terrain these tires will last well over 8 000 km that s in the worstconditions saidDutch. Theyhave exceeded 16 000 km in test on trails and gone over 32 000 km on a road wheel. The tire has reached speeds of 120kmph on both trailandpavement. The pneumatic tire has been around for a long time and it works very well. I don t believe pneumatics will ever be replaced completely but airless tire technology will continue to grow and be adopted all over theworld saidDutch. WeseeAfricaasatremendousmarket for the TerrainArmor tires whether the tires are on an off-road Polaris product or eventually being used in the light and mediumtruck SUVmarket saidDutch. The abundance of parkland long stretches of rural highways and urban obstacles in Africa are the perfect environment for our tire. You don thavetoworrybeingstrandedbyaflat or carry spares which adds to a vehicle s logisticfootprint. zxxxx Hutchinson Industries Hutchinson Industries a manufacturer of mobility components for wheeled vehicles since 1926 with a full line of productsincludingrunflatsforvariouslevels of security. Withanexpertiseandexperience of several decades Hutchinson covers a completerangeofrunflats foranytypeof application civilian and militaries with or without rubber for various kind of wheels andtires saidAlexisBart Hutchinson s Defense & Industry Export Manager. TheHutchinsonfamilyofrunflatswith their VFI (variable function insert) and VPPV have become according to the company thegoldstandard inmilitaryrunflatapplications. Hutchinson s Countermine VFI is specially designed to increase protection and survivability from mine blast. The tires are the primary target to immobilize a wheeled vehicle. It is vital to the crew that a vehicle can escape at high speed or complete its mission with one or all of the tires flat. The VFI has withstood some of the harshest wartime conditions and has proven to be priceless to the protection of thecrewanditsvehicle accordingtothe Resilient Technologies non-pneumatic tire. company. Hutchinson s portfolio includes a varietyofrunflattechnologiesandsolutions. Many of these solutions are currently providing protection on military applications worldwide and can be manufactured to meet known standards such as FINABEL ortheUSArmyspecifications.Hutchinson canalsoprovideacustomrunflatsolution tailoredtospecificcustomerneeds. The rubber material and reinforcements that the Hutchinson VFI is composed of permit it to absorb a substantial amount of energy from the mine blast. In combination with the Hutchinson aluminum wheel the VFIhasshowntosignificantlyreducethe acceleration from a blast. Rarelydoesonesolutionfitsallcustomerneeds. Thequestionofperformance is closely discussed with our customers and we make sure to offer them the adapted system that is usually a compromise in termsofprice performance weight etc. said Bart. Performance also highly varies depending on external parameters-- Hutchinson know how and experience is a key factor to accompany our customers at the best and not propose theoretical performanceonly. Hutchinson offers a wide range of systemstofitmostvehicles. Weoffermore than one hundred sizes and for different performancerequirementsincomposite rubber mixofrubberandcomposite said Bart. Weareaspecialistinrunflatand offers custom made solutions perfectly adaptedforeachapplication. Export is very important for Hutchinson and Africa is part of a challenging but interestingareatodevelop explainedBart. Runflatscanbeveryusefulandevennecessary for several applications that are not always explored--ambulance cash in transit people movers for example. Hutchinson is already there however there is still room toimproveanddiscovernewpotential. zxxxx M-Safe M-Safe of India was established with a strong determination to become India s top mostmanufacturerofsafetyequipmentfor military police and VVIP vehicles. To date they have built a client base that includes government agencies and organizations (civil law enforcement military) private security companies and protection. Accordingtothecompany Wehave the capability to customize and adapt to 12 African Defense April May 2015 the ever-changing need for multi-purpose armoredvehiclesbyourclients.Weremain highly focused on the needs of our clients and our goal is to always exceed their expectations byproducingthehighestquality runflatsystemsforarmoredvehiclesfrom luxurycarstoheavy-dutytruck. Our mobility and survivability products are designed to keep you moving from dangeroussituations.Weofferavarietyof products for security military and commercialwheeledvehicleapplications.Runflat systems provide the capability to continue journey for some extended distance while experiencingoneormoredeflatedordamaged. Their design uses a runner-roller design that provides excellent performance and heatresistance. Therollerissecurelyattached to the wheel which is allowed to move or rotate about the wheel at the same speed as the tire thus reducing friction and heat build up. The company believes that their inserts give the driver superior handling and control compared to other static type runflatsystems.Theirinsertismadefrom a specially formulated lightweight high strength compound designed to resist crack propagation from ballistic attack and severe road hazards. zxxxx RunFlat International RunFlat International was established in 2001 as a spin off from its parent company WestleyPlasticsusingitspolymertechnologytodeveloprun-flattireinsertsystems According to the company Our composite material has been developed and is processedspecificallyforrun-flatapplications while our products are subject to multiple patents. Theirdesignsareusefulforboth single-piece and split rim wheels. For single piece wheels their design consists of two or three antiballistic composite segments bolted around the wheel rimwhichremainfixedontherimwhenthe tireisfullyinflatedbutslipanticlockwiseto the forward rotation of the tire and wheel whenthetireisdeflated compensatingfor the difference in diameters between the tires (inflatedanddeflated)oneachsideofthe axle.TheseDynamicRunflatsareparticularlyeasytofitthankstotheirpatented lockingdevicewhichalsodoesnotrequire thefittertoinserttheirfingersinsidethetire wheninstallingtherunflat.Thesesystems also offer a particularly smooth and safe ride inrunflatmodesincenogreaseisrequired insidethetire(onlyontheinnerprofileof therunflatwhichisincontactwiththerim. RunflatInternational sStaticRunflat system for multiple piece demountable (split) rims is primarily designed for military applications on and off-road. The Static System is made of three antiballistic composite segments bolted tightly around the wheel rimwhichremainfixedandkeepthetirein placewhetherinflatedornot.Itsbeadlock functionisparticularlystronginrunflat mode due its patented shape (the base of therunflatspreadsunderthevehicleload thus applying further pressure on the tire beads) soevendeflatedtiresdonotrotate on the rim keeping the vehicle in motion at all times. Forshorterdistances RunflatInternational offer the Ty-Lok series the most economicalsolutionintheirrange.Forrunflat distances longer than 5km and to protect the rim from damage it is however recommended to use RunFlat Dynamic Systems. It is known that Egypt has recently tested RunFlat s tire inserts on one of their 6x6 armored personnel carriers which drove about50kmswiththreeofsixtiresflat. zxxxx Rodgard Rodgard a division of Hutchinson Industries designs and manufactures tire mobility inserts for the wheeled vehicle industry. Weprovideproductsforsecurity militaryandcommercialapplications said the company. Rodgard pneumatic tire inserts are designed to provide extended mobility when oneormoretiresaredeflated andaremade from a specially formulated lightweight high strength compound designed to resist crack propagation from ballistic attack and severe road hazards. The proprietary material compound is strong enough to support the load of a fully armored vehicle. Theirrunflatdesigniscomprisedoftwo components a roller and a runner. The runner is securely attached to the wheel in the drop center and provides a track or channel in which the roller is allowed to move or rotate aboutthewheelatthesamespeed as the tire thus reducing friction and heat build up. RodgardRunflatshavebeenusedand proven for over 25 years of service on armored vehicles police vehicles riot control vehiclesandcash-in-transitvehicles. said thecompany. TheRodgardRunflatpro- vides excellent handling and performance afteratiredeflationcomparedtootherstatic typerunflatsystems. Thecompany srunflatproductshave been designed to US Army NATO FINABEL speed and distance standards of 50km at 50km hr. zxxxx RunFlat Tire Systems RFTS is another producer and manufacturerofrunflattiresystems compositerunflatinserts polymertirebandsandinserts security and military wheels and custom mobility and security solutions. Asagloballeaderinrunflattechnology since the 1970s our company protects some of the most important vehicles in the world troop carriers armored vehicles presidential convoys bulletproof cars and custom limousines and security and off road vehicles use our products to keep movingevenduringthemostdifficultsituations andlife-threateningattackscenarios said the company. zxxxx Safesure Runflat Systems Safesure in an Indian company offering customized vehicle mobility solutions for armored and up-armored vehicles used by police military border security forces special protection forces and VIP s. Our in house research and development anddesignteamconsistsofqualifiedand experienced professionals with international reputations saidthecompany. Safesurerunflatsystemsaredesigned to provide vehicle capability to continue movement for extended distance while experiencingoneormoredeflatedor damagedtireshitbyanrifleorautomatic weaponfireortireblast. Wecancustom manufacturerunflatsystemsfor4x4 6x6 and8x8wheeledarmoredvehicles said the company. They also advertise that can develop soindividual solutions with short notice. Theycanalsocustomizetherunflat systems for vehicles using tire pressure monitoring systems. SafesurerunflatscomplywithNATO and FINABEL (20.A.5) standards and are approved by the Ordnance Factory Board Indian Ministry of Defence and major original equipmentmanufacturers. Ourproducts have successfully passed tests against armorpiercingroundsB32byHPWhiteLaboratory saidthecompany. African Defense April May 2015 13 Considering the advantages and synergies of focused acquisition. TheEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS) aregionalgrouping of15WestAfricancountries hasbecome an increasingly important security actor and a potential partner for NATO. Following troubled interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberiaearlierinthe21stcentury ECOWAS brokered peace in Guinea-Bissau and provided the bulk of troops deployed on the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Of Africa s various regional andsub-regionalgroupings ECOWASis regarded as enjoying the greatest prospects for security integration. Yetthereisonesignificantchallengeto theinteroperabilityofWestAfricanforces holdingECOWASbackfrommountingsuccessful interventions independent of powers like the US or France. Namely there is a lack of standardization in small arms and The African Standardization Challenge By Paul Pryce 14 African Defense April May 2015 light weapons used by member state ground forces.Amongtheinfantryfieldedby ECOWASmembers thereisaneclecticmix of weapons in which the AK-47 and its Chineseknock-offsfigureprominentlybutalso popular are the American-made M16A2 Belgium s FN FAL and Germany s Heckler &KochG3A3.Manyofthesefirearmsemploy different forms of ammunition creating a logistical nightmare for any intervention in whichforcesofmultipleECOWASmembers may engage in combat against insurgents as was the case in Mali in 2013. This supply issue is experienced even within the armed forces of individual member states. For example the Nigerian Armyhastraditionallyequippeditsunits withtheAK-47andtheFNFAL whichfire the7.62x39mmWarsawPactroundand the 7.62x51mm NATO round respectively. This situation will be further complicated as Nigeria accepts delivery of as much as 6 000 Polish-made Beryl M762 assault rifles whicharechamberedforthesame ammunition as the AK-47. As a result platoon-levelunitsengagedinfirefights againstBokoHaramelementsmayfindthat they are unable to share ammunition among themselvesassquadmatesareequipped with entirely different weapons. Currently onlyafewECOWASmemberstateshave standard-issueassaultrifles.Liberianunits arealmostuniformlyequippedwithM16A2 assaultrifles whileSenegalhasadopted South Korea s Daewoo K-2 as the standard infantry weapon. But these small states are the exception to the rule. It is vital to the future success of ECOWASthatmembersstandardizeammunition. The standardization of ammunition by NATO members since the 1950s has ensured Alliance forces enjoy a good level of cohesion and interoperability when embarking on such missions as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. On the one hand it may seem intuitive thatECOWASshouldadoptthe7.62x39mm round as its standard given that the AK-47 is so prevalent among the armed forces of the region. But adopting this round as the standard would undermine modernization efforts by regional militaries many of which are tied to important security sector reforms such as anti-corruption measures and increased civilian oversight of the military. The suspension of one aspect of ongoing defence reforms would be an all too convenient excuse to suspend all defence reforms and revert to old less constructive practices. As an example of modernization efforts even prior to the ouster of President Blaise Compaore Burkina Faso was adoptingSwiss-madeSIGSG540assaultrifles as a standard. Like Senegal s Daewoo K-2 and the M-16s that remain in service among Ghanaian Liberian and Cape Verdean units the SIG SG 540 is chambered for the NATO standard 5.56x45mm round. AdoptingthisastheECOWASstandard would ensure that NATO member states are better able to provide logistical support to ECOWASmissionsandwouldalsoallow for example French and Togolese forces to freely operate alongside one another sharingequipmentandammunitionasnecessary. ECOWAShasthepotentialtoleadthe rest of the continent on security integration setting a continent-wide standard. After all this issue was seen during AFISMA when other major African powers also suffered profound logistical problems. Chad which contributed considerably to the Malian intervention despite being a member not of ECOWASbutoftheEconomicCommunity ofCentralAfricanStates(ECCAS) equipsits own forces with the same eclectic mix as Nigeria AK-47s FN FALs and M16s. DemonstratedleadershipinthisareabyECOWAS could serve as a model for institutions elsewhereinAfrica raisingWestAfrica s profileandensuringthatotherpowerslike ChadwillneedtorelyonECOWAS guidance rather than vice versa. Paul Pryce is a Research Analyst at the Atlantic Council of Canada. With degrees in political science from universities in both Canada and Estonia he has previously worked as a Research Fellow at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. His research interests are diverse and include maritime security NATO affairs and African regional integration. African Defense April May 2015 15 African Space Policy and Strategy Recently African states started to look at the value and prosperity in intraAfrica relationships this led the 54 African members in Africa to realize the role that space technology and its application can play to enhance African life and contribute to resource mobilization. A process started at the African leadership conference in Kenya 2011 with the Mombasa declaration on space and African development. In 2012 the African Ministerial Council of Science and Technology (AMCOST) asked the African Union to formulate a space-working group that aims at developing an integrated African space policy and strategy. The working group has been chaired by South Africa and membership from Algeria Cameroon Congo Brazzaville Egypt Ghana Kenya Namibia Nigeria and Tanzania. The African Union space working group worked hard for two years to integrate African efforts and initiatives in the space arena and survey the already existing infrastructure for resources usage optimization. Additional inputs have been continuously received from many African states experts and councils to formulate the targeted documents. Thedraftedpolicydocumentreflects how space science and technology can playasignificantroleintheinternational regional and national economic and social developmentefforts.Itidentifiesthemain goal of using space science and technology forthebenefitofAfricanpeople where optimalsocio-economicbenefitscanbe achieved. On the other hand it points to the important issue of building infrastructure in African states and how space can be integralandbeneficialasvaluecost. The policy addresses some main objectives such as user needs international cooperation coordination between African states and market prospective issues. This AfricanSpacePolicyidentifiesthekey policy drivers (goals) that will inform the agenda for any formal space initiatives on the continent. The policy drivers are supported by a set of objectives that emulate the critical factors that need to be addressed in maintaining a viable and sustainable space program. In addition the objectives are underpinned by a set of guiding principles that form the basis of all decisions and actions and in turn inform the core building blocks of the African space agenda. The African Space Policy is thus a guiding framework for the formalization of the African space agenda but will need to be complemented by an African Space Strategy and an implementation plan to give effect to the policy. For each of these policy objectives there are a policy principles that will help achieve these goals in an appropriate and efficientway. On the other hand the African Space strategyreflectedtheideasstatedinthe policy Africanexpertsdrawnfromfieldsof earth observation astronomy space physics metrology and navigation and positioning and communication strategy top lines. The strategyenablesAfricatobenefitfromits abundant and untapped space resources. The focus of a space strategy is on four highlevel themes emphasizing the following For Earth observation it targets the establishment of user needs that address Africa s socio-economic opportunities and challenges.Withvisionaryemphaseson being well capacitated in the development of integrated earth observations towards improvingqualityoflifeandeconomic growth in African contentment. In this context its aims at developing critical mass of capacity of human capital in earth observation applications and usage developing and improve earth observation institutions in Africa foster knowledge sharing among African experts users and stakeholders developing space and in-situ Building on existing frameworks and new initiatives Africa moves towards a common strategy. infrastructure that helps achieve the user needsandsocietalbenefits.Thisincludes but not limited to space-based and in-situ infrastructures ground segment and ICT infrastructures generating services and products throughout earth observation applications via web-based and appropriate technologies that meet the user needs. Fostering the stakeholder s engagement to ensure the generation of the relevant services and products and maximize the benefitsofearthobservationapplications. Raising awareness among the public users policy and decision makers develop strategy and mechanism for data access and sharing data integrity and dissemination data accuracy and validity data standardization and harmonization metadata data archiving and repository. Some critical issues can be raised such as human and institutional capacity technological disparity data sharing policy products and services sharing policy political will coordination challenges resources mobilization and governance. To achieve this objectives the strategy focuses on creating an inventory of earth observation activities and capabilities gap analysis human and institutional development infrastructures development and maintenance research development strategic partnerships outreach and awareness continuous products and services development establish networks and communities of practice (user forums conferences workshops) and small medium enterprise development. For navigation and satellite communication the strategy addresses user needs such as education (including E-learning) telemedicine emergency communication security universal access includes telecommunication and broadcasting indigenous industry and export of space technologies and services operational services and investment in researchanddevelopment.Withvisionary emphases on universal affordability and sustainability--including the sharing under a partnership model to federate demand-- By Ayman Ahmed (PhD MBA) National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Science Egyptian Space Program 16 African Defense April May 2015 and taking into account short medium and long term returns on investment with a focus on high value services that will drive further infrastructure. Some challenges strategy has identifiedtoachievethesegoalssuchas cost government subsidies for deprived communities funding model sustainability government capacity to make use of benefits groundsegment spacesegment human capacity development industry development conflictofinterestandcyber security. One of the foundation elements of the African Space Policy is the Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM) Initiative. More recently based on recommendations from meetings held in Abuja Nigeria 2010 and at the African Union s 4th ministerial conference in Khartoum Sudan in 2012--given that not Regional African Satellite Communications Organization Regardless of the indicator considered (telephone density telecommunication penetration rate in rural areas availability and efficiency of telecommunications services) Africa viewed globally appears to be in every respect the least developed continent in the area of telecommunications. Moreover the virtual non-existence of direct links between African countries compel them in order to communicate among themselves to transit through Europe or the United States entailing charges that amount to several millions of dollars annually. Increasingly aware of the role of telecommunications as the engine of economic development and recognizing that investment in telecommunications can considerably increase the level of productivity and effectiveness of all the other sectors and improve the quality of life and furthermore constitute an element of motivation for any investor African leaders decided following several consultations to combine their efforts in providing the continent with telecommunications infrastructure capable of ensuring the sustainable development of telecommunications in the continent and in each African country with special emphasis on service to rural areas. In order to respond to this concern the African leaders decided to undertake a feasibility study. The study which was conducted from 1987 to 1990 involved 50 African countries and 600 African experts in addition to support from international organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union the United Nations Development Program and the African Development Bank. Indeed this was the most comprehensive study ever carried out in the area of telecommunications in Africa. The findings of the study were adopted by African states in February 1991 in Abuja Nigeria. The highlights of the study were the following A telecommunications satellite tailored to well-defined specifications is the best technological choice for satisfying Africa s telecommunications needs globally and optimally. This system can only be economically and financially viable provided it is designed on a continental scale. In order to implement the findings of the study African States meeting in Abidjan in May 1992 decided to create the Regional African Satellite Communications Organization--RASCOM. RASCOM took two decades to become fully operational which offers a realistic time frame for future Pan-African space initiatives. This period was primarily a result of delays in intergovernmental negotiations and in implementing long-promised commitments. Further delay arose from technical failures its first satellite RASCOM QAF 1 launched in 2007 soon failed with the replacement RASCOM-QAF1R launched only in 2010. RASCOM s success (from its 20 transponders) has linked 150 000 villages to telecommunications services. all African administrations are signatories of the RASCOM convention--the placing under RASCOM of the orbit spectrum resourcesrequiredtoaccommodate continental satellites is seen as unnecessary but they will be within the vision of the African space organizational framework. As a way forward the African space strategy considers a systems approach in the development of the satellite communication network wherein the whole value chain is broken down into subprograms to be worked on in an overall pre-allocated timeframe. Indeed space science and technology presentsauniqueopportunityforusers from African states as it contributes towards a better proactive management of disease outbreaks natural resources environment natural hazards and disasters weather forecasting climate change mitigation and adaptation agriculture and food security peacekeepingmissionsandconflicts and maritime activities among others. The strategy on the other hand focuses attention on space science and astronomy with emphases on the already existing national and international partnershipsandentitiessuchas Square Kilometre Array (SKA) African VLBI Network (AVN) Hartebeesthoek Radio Astronomy Observatory (HartRAO) South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO) Southern African Large Telescope (SALT) MultifrequencyInterferometric Telescope for Radio Astronomy (MITRA) National institute for astronomy and geophysics-Egypt South Africa National Space Agency (SANSA) Nigeria s National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) Algerian Space Agency (ASAL) National Remote Sensing Station (CNT - Algeria) Research Center of Astronomy and Astrophysics(CRAAG - Algeria) Royal Center for Space research (CRERS Morocco) and Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development (RCMD Kenya). The African Space Policy and Strategy is thus a guiding framework for the formalization of the African Space Agenda. It will be complemented by a plan of action with the goal of addressing user needs ensuring the access to space services developing the regional market coordinating the African space arena enhancing space governance and promoting international cooperation. African Defense April May 2015 17 Growing Challenges of Peace and Security in Africa Overthepastdecade WestAfricahas gained considerable ground in consolidating peace and democratic governance after having been ravaged by deadly long yearsofconflicts widespreadhumanrights violations and political instability. These hard-won gains have generally brought stability to the region and enabled positive economic growth and development with a promise potential to reverse the trend of widespread poverty youth unemployment and to promote sustainable livelihoods good governance and democratic practice. Asweallknow WestAfricaregionis home to almost 340 million people representing a rich cultural diversity and human capital. It stretches from Mauritania to Nigeria and covers the disparate climatic zones from arid Sahel desert to its north to the fertile land and rain forests to its south. Despite the slowing down of the global economy theWestAfricaregionhasinrecentyears been the fastest growing economy in Africa with well above an average of 6 percent (2012) and 5.6 percent (2013) growth rate. However there continues to be a growing disparity within the countries on human development compounded by governance and security challenges including transnational crime such as arms drug and human traffickingandterrorism.Thechallenges facedthroughouttheWestAfricanregion are complex and diverse. In the Sahel for instance the fallout of the2011Libyancrisisandthesubsequent spilloveroftheconflictcontinuetohavea devastating impact on neighboring countries. The case of Mali is fresh in our mind. West Africa is a complex mix of factors that impact politics security and personal relationships. Even after the massive support and engagement of the international community which lead to the stabilization of the situation in Mali the country today remains fragile in the face of numerous security challenges. In the northern part of Mali extremist terrorist groups have not only continued their brutal attacks against Malian forces and civilians as well as UN peacekeepers and international aid workers but have also kept the political peace process hostage. Just this weekend two civilian colleagues were killed near Gao. The aftermath of the Libyan crisis as well as the insecurity caused by terrorist groups and organized criminal groups in the Sahel have also affected Niger a resiliencefragile country also pressed on its southern border by the activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group. Meanwhile the structural problems faced by Sahelian countries in the area of economic development and democratic By Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) 18 African Defense April May 2015 governance can also cause political disruptions especially where an ever-growing youth population is frustrated by the lack of opportunities and outlook for the future. This problem was undoubtedly a contributing factor last year when Burkina Faso nearly plunged into a crisis following a popular uprising that saw the expulsion of the country s President of 27 years in just two days. Indeed the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria can also be traced in parts to the Sahel bred securitythreatsandtheirconsequencesinthe region.Whiletheongoingjointeffortsare achieving concrete result the long-term solution lies in substantially in comprehensively addressing the root causes of the fragility in the Sahel region. I should mention in this regard the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel developed to help achieve this objective.TheUNhasadedicatedOffice tasked with the primary responsibility to implement the strategy in close collaborationwithallUNofficesandagenciesas well as the countries of the region. The OfficeisheadedbyaSpecialEnvoyofthe Secretary-General. Over the past year three of the four countries of the Mano River Union have been ravaged by the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease. This unprecedented public health disaster which prompted the establishmentofafirst-everUNemergency health mission UNMEER has isolated Liberia Sierra Leone and Guinea in the region and left their economies badly affected. The crisis has also exposed fault lines and weaknesses at national and regional levels particularly regarding health care structure and delivery system. Social fabric was affected and public trust on public institution was further eroded. Most worrisome was that the EVD outbreak slowed down the progress that was being made in thepostconflictpeace-buildingeffortsin the affected countries. For instance efforts in the implementation of the trans-border security strategy in the Mano River Union were almost completely stopped owing to the outbreak of the disease. The Gulf of Guinea is another area ofinstabilityinWestAfrica whichalso straddles countries in the Central African region.ManyWestAfricancountrieshave joined the club of petroleum oil producing countries includingGhana.Whilethisis welcome as an economic blessing experience from other countries especially our big brother Nigeria - has shown that if not well managed mineral resources like oil (as was the case with diamonds in Sierra Leone) could be a source of potential tension or what others have termed a curse. The petro dollars from oil have also attracted the attention of pirates and other interest groups who have embarked on the phenomenon of oil bunkering at high sea causing a great toll on security of oil and commercial vessels. Therefore the issue of maritime insecurity has become a serious threat in the Gulf of Guinea attracting attention from ECOWAS ECCASandtheAUtomeetin Yaound in June 2013 to seek a collective solution to the menace. Affected countries from both regions have shown commitment and made progress in the adoption and the operationalization of maritime security mechanism. UN support and encouragement to this endeavor was provided and will continuetobeprovidedbyUNOWAand UNOCA. 2015 and 2016 are the years of another cycleofelectionsinWestAfrica.Astheyear 2014 was coming to an end the Burkinabe experience came to underline the volatility of electoral processes and contests in our region. The move to amend the constitution and the ensuing popular insurgency and its consequencessentechoesthroughoutthe continent and was received as a warning signal in countries where long-time political leaders were suspected of nursing plans and or ambition to amend the constitution and extend their rule. NearerhomeinWestAfrica inclusive dialogue on political participation and transparent electoral processes is gaining currency in Togo Guinea and Benin Republic. The main issues revolve around electoral time table polling voting system biometric voters card the establishment of constitutional bodies and general the work of the electoral commissions. I must hasten to mention that in almost all the countries affected political actors both sides of the divide (presidential majority and the opposition) have demonstrated commitment and responsibility to peaceful settlement in aconsensualway.Whiletheresultsofsuch efforts vary from country to country little efforts would be needed from the international community to help stakeholders to bridge their differences and to conduct credible and violence free elections. In this regard Nigeria has set a positive pace. The region s natural leader silenced all sceptics after it successfully conducted two rounds of elections that displayed an unprecedented level of credibility and fairness. The peaceful execution of the general elections in this country of 175 million people underlines how political leadership and commitment to non-violence and noninstigation by party leaders can serve as a key factor in avoiding electoral violence. Nigerians acknowledged as critical the role played by the international community in ensuring transparency and non-violence before during and after the elections. I am just back from Nigeria where our preventive and behind the screens diplomacy and the great resolve of Nigerians and relevant institutions including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) have just successfully concluded the 2015 general elections in which a former military leader H.E. General Muhammadu Buhari defeated the incumbent President Jonathan. The historic congratulatory phone call from President Jonathan to General Buhari at a moment the collation was still ongoing completely doused tension in the country. Throughout the campaign the presidential candidates denounced violence as a means to retaining or ascending to power at all cost through what has now come to be known as the Abuja Peace Accords (I &II). Here ImustpaytributetoKofiAnnan for his role in the signing of the Abuja I AccordonJanuary14 2015.Workingwiththe OfficeoftheInter-PartyAffairs civilsociety organizations such as the Situation Room (a platform of Nigerian organizations working in areas of elections peace and security) the Kukah Centre and the Savannah Centre with the support of the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme(UNDP).KofiAnnan playedasignificantroleindousingtension and ensuring the peaceful elections in Nigeria. I recall President Jonathan harping that his political ambition is not worth the blood of a single Nigerian. His exemplary and statesmanlike manner in conceding defeat is a great message sent to all African countries embarking on elections this year andsubsequently.Iwillthereforewishto relaythismessagetotherestofWestAfrica to say that Nigeria has shown the way. The specificmessageforGhanaasitprepares for the 2016 elections is that having a head of electoral commission who is a person of high integrity professionally competent independent-minded and mindful of their personal dignity and legacy is important in Continued on page 30 African Defense April May 2015 19 South Africa s Defense Budget 2015.....and Beyond According to the South African Defence Review it could take five years or more to recover from the dismal state of the SANDF s funding problem. South African defense spending has been under much scrutiny of late with defense experts calling for a radical transformation of the procurement process followed by a robust increase in the defense budgets for the coming years. SDI s Dev Mehta takes a closer look at this year s defense budget and the dynamics expected to be played out over the next decade. ing of 68 million in 2017-2018 up from The current dismal state of the South African defense industry is the result of years 54 million in 2014. Other highlights of the of neglect and abuse. A defense review con- budget include immediate procurements of a medium and light transport aircraft and ducted by the government in March 2014 land based and airborne C4ISR systems. highlights the country s capability gaps in Common services have received the the areas of ammunition critical infrastruchighest allocation of 1.8 billion folture skilled personnel combat vehicles lowed by the Army-- 1.43 billion Air transport aircraft and the overall structuring Force-- 0.71 billion of the procurement and the Navy-- 0.35 process. The South Even with an immediate billion. According African National intervention it could take to SDI estimates Defence Force Army allocations (SANDF) is deemed atleastfiveyearstoarrest are expected to to be in a critical thedeclineandanotherfive increase from an state of decline estimated 1.46 with the current years to develop a limited billion in 2016 budget allocations and sustainable defense to 2.13 billion in both capital and 2020 at a CAGR of revenue not consid- capability. eredtobeadequate 2014 South Africa Defence Review 9.91 percent with the increases for the to meet the ever Air Force. Navy and growing needs of restoring the country s military effectiveness. Common Services pegged at 11.2 percent 6.7 percent and 9.3 percent respectively. Infactaccordingtothefindingsofthereview even with an immediate intervention The budget for the Ministry of Interior has also increased in terms of local currency itcouldtakeatleastfiveyearstoarrestthe but has dipped in terms of buying power to declineandanotherfiveyearstodevelopa value 10.5 billion in 2015 (2014-- 10.7 limitedandsustainabledefensecapability. The general consensus on South Africa s billion). defense budget for 2015 is that it is too low for any radical transformation to begin. Even zxxxx Is South Africa Spending Enough on Defense though this year s budget marks a 4 percent increase over 2014 it continues to shrink in South Africa s defense industry is still realtermsowingtoinflationandcurrency reeling from the policies of suppression of fluctuations.SouthAfrica scommitmentto its armed forces during the apartheid era. border safeguarding and regional security The undermining of black resistance during has resulted in 225 million and 363 milwhite rule wars in Namibia and Angola and lion being allocated for related missions till the support of the regime in Zimbabwe all 2017. However budget constraints have contributed to divide public opinion which resulted in only 13 army companies being along with the increased focus on economic deployed for border security as opposed to development has contributed to the military theproposed22.Anotherareatobenefitis special operations which will receive fund- being neglected. 20 African Defense April May 2015 According to a recent report released by SDI South Africa s defense spending declined from 4.8 billion in 2011 to 4.3 billion in 2015 and all this in spite of the industry facing critical shortages in many areas. The 2014 defense review however is expected to catalyze the South African defense market over the next few years with budget allocations expected to increase to US 6.9 billion by 2020. Even though this increase is substantial when compared to the inertia the market experienced over the last decade and more it is not considered to be enough to galvanize the country s armed forces into a powerful regional force. One of the main reasons this is so is that the country harbors military ambitions beyond just its own territory as is evident from its strong military contingents in Congo and Darfur. The armed forces also lend support to anti-piracy operations off the Mozambiquecoast whilepositioningitself as the leader in all of Southern Africa. In the words of Helmoed Heitman a South African military expert who was involved in making the 2014 defense review of the 25 countries involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa we are the ninth largest in terms of troopcontributions. Developing countries usually spend about 2 percent of their GDP on defense and more if the country is in need of urgent military modernization with India being a good example. SDI estimates Indian defense spending to average about 2.1 percent of their GDP during the period 2015-2019 and this is in spite of having to combat the perennial problems of a third world nation. South Africa however has been consistentlyspendingbelowthisfigure withthe numbers totaling an average of only 1.19 percentoverthelastfiveyears similarto countries such as New Zealand which faces virtually no external threats nor has any serious military ambitions. The country also ranks below Algeria Angola Libya Kenya Morocco and Egypt in terms of defense budget allotments as a percentage of GDP. Further if guidance is sought from comparisons with other countries in the region South Africa fares poorly with other major countries such as Angola and Algeria having spent a total of 24.2 billion and 45.1 billion respectively during the period 20102014 as compared to South Africa s 22.2 billion. These numbers assume far greater meaning when looked at in light of South Africa s desire to establish itself as the major African power in the region and the world. Further with regional powers now expected to possess stronger defense capabilities than others South Africa needs to take another look at the strategic direction of its defense spending over the next decade. According tothefindingsofthedefensereview even African Defense April May 2015 21 if South Africa were to double its defense budget overnight it would not be able to plug the African military capacity gap that results in French US and other interventions onthecontinent. There is also a severe disconnect between the missions given to the SANDF and the resources available to carry them out. For example in March 2013 the rebels carried out an attack on a contingent of South African soldiers in Central African Republic (known now as the Battle of Bangui) and almost took over their positions due to shortages in ammunition and support services. zxxxx Market Opportunities Land Based C4ISR South Africa s military C4ISR assets have found increased usageoverthelastfiveyears withthecountry s renewed focus on executing reconnaissance and surveillance missions. The country s spending on groundbased systems can be attributed to the investments in upgrades and replacement of the communications infrastructure. Cyber security is one of the primary areas of investment as the DoD s budget aims to dispel fears about recent reports released byexpertanalystsfromtheconsultingfirm WolfpackInformationRisk statingthat it would not be hard to shut down major South African governmental websites and information networks considering the minimal cybersecurity measures in place. Expenditure on this segment is expected to increase at a strong CAGR of 7.4 percent till 2025. Naval Vessels South Africa is expected toplayanincreasinglysignificantrolein maintaining regional stability in the African Union with a growing need to address a number of maritime issues such as illegal fishing piracy andanincreasinglyactive drugtraffickingcartel.Thesecountermeasure operations are expected to entail the use of amphibious platforms in order to rapidlyinserttroopsatflashpoints.Inaddition to such regional security operations the Navy is also involved in a number of peace- keepingoperationsthatrequireamphibious ships to land infantry troops in troubled regions. As per SDI estimates spending on this sector is expected to increase at a robust CAGR of 14.3 percent till 2025. TransportAircraft Withtheneedtoreplace itsfleetofDouglasC-47Dakotas South Africa is actively looking for maritime surveillance aircraft options. However SDI predicts the eventual purchase of multimission aircraft such as the Airbus C-295 which is a light transport aircraft with maritimepatrollingcapabilities.Withthe country s defense budget currently under scrutiny such procurement will provide a more suitable alternative to address multiplerequirementsataffordablecosts. TheSAAFalsocontinuestooperateitsfleet of C-130BZ Hercules as its primary airlift andtransportaircraft.Withanaverageage of over 50 years these aircraft are now approaching the end of their serviceable lives. Optionstoreplacethisfleetoftransport aircraft include Airbus s A400 and Lockheed Martin s C-130BZ Hercules. UAVs The next decade is expected to witnesssignificantspendingonUAVplatforms for use in a wide variety of roles within the South African military as well as civilian areas. Most of the UAVs being inducted are expected to be surveillance and reconnaissance platforms with the Bataleur and Seeker 400 being the most likely choice. These platforms will be used for will be used for peacekeeping missions and non-military applications such as crime prevention border patrol disaster management election monitoring as well as search and rescue. Business intelligence for the global defence industry Forecasts Analysis Competitor Intel Tenders News Opinion For more information visit or contact SDI directly on 44 207 936 6783 or e-mail clientservices 22 African Defense April May 2015 Can the Botswana Defence Force Attain its Effectiveness Posture A critical look at the military effectiveness levels the BDF has established for itself. What will it take to get there. A capability appearing lethally effective in parade will not translate into an effective military or a cure for national security. StrategistssuchasAllenMillet WilliamsonMurray andKennethWatman define military effectiveness as a process by which armedforcestransformresourcesintofighting power. A fully effective military is one deriving maximum combat power from available resources physically and politically. Defense acquisitionorprocurement asit sotherwise known plays a central role in military effectiveness.LindaS.BrantandFrancisW. A. Hearn describe it as a process whereby the military avail itself capabilities through expenditureofnationaltreasure. The BDF is not disposed to transform itsresourcesproficientlyenoughtorealize itsenvisionedeffectiveness.Specifically attainment of their vision is undermined by a mismatch between its missions and capabilities deficientpoliciesandadefense management framework and procurement system too duplicitous to attend the real needs and peculiarities of its military. The BDF s vision of a light highly mobile force resonates well with missions dominated by action against non-state actors poachers border security and peace enforcements operations. However this has not been matched withtherequisitecapabilities(theytended to be heavy weapon platforms suited for interstateconflicts).Additionally theBDF s rapid development meant there wasn t a corresponding growth in defense policies andstrategiestodefineitsroles forcelevels andsustainment.Consequently Botswana hasnodefenseacquisitionmanagement system the current procurement process is too rudimentary to address the peculiarities of the military and lacks the focus to deliver appropriate capabilities. zxxxx Assignments and Capabilities Mismatch The BDF is hard to read its capabilities barely match current missions regional security environs or the versatility of its vision. Its order of battle as captured in DefenseWeb isananti-thesisoftheservice s vision statement. Its inventory consists of heavy weapons platforms these are obsolete cold-war era capabilities drawn from all corners of the world. Poor choices for the missions the BDF has been engaged in over the past two decades. For the most part these have been actions against internal non-state actors and aid to civil authorities assignments calling for the light mobile forces correctly advocated by the vision. A reviewhighlightsthisequipmentandassignments mismatch and offers something to consider in preparing for the future. The BDF s origins portray a military formed more as a beacon to sovereignty rather than a potent force to counter powerful adversaries. The creation of the BDF thoughanimportantfirststepinthebuilding of a defense system did not halt the acts of aggression from Rhodesia and South Africa. In fact the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia continued to destabilize Botswana until the cease-fireafterthesigningoftheLancaster House Agreement leading to Zimbabwe independence in 1980. The violation of Botswana s territorial integrity was not only confinedtotheRhodesianborder some incursions were also perpetrated by South Africa. During wars of liberation history attributes the country s survival to the diplomatic genius of the polity particularly the country sfirstpresidentSirSeretseKhama than to the effectiveness of the military. Whenthewarsendedinthe1990s telling events in international security were taking place theendoftheColdWar arisein In pursuit of effectiveness the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has set itself a decent vision of a professional prompt and decisive force. The debate is whether the BDF can attain the level of military effectiveness espoused in its model vision. By Colonel Sianang Mokuedi Botswana Defence Force African Defense April May 2015 23 non-state actor threats and a commensurate increase in peace and stability operations in Africa. As a result the BDF increasingly resembled a gendarmerie engaging more in homeland security than conventional military missions. In response to the nation sWildlifeAnti-poachingUnit sfailure to cope with increasingly violent poaching activities the government brought in the BDF (they would eventually take primary responsibility). In addition the BDF began a losing battle to secure borders against illegal immigrants and accompanying criminal elements. Indeed the 1990s saw a rise in such activity (particularly armed robberies) and this increase threatened to undermine businessconfidenceinBotswana. Concurrently the BDF was heavily engaged in many regional peace-keeping missions from the 1992 Operation Restore Hope inSomalia throughUnitedNation s UNOMOZinMozambiquetothe1998 OperationBoleas inLesotho.Surprisingly while Botswana committed to providing a battalion to the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade in 2007 it has not participated in any of the current and more robust peace-enforcement missions. The closest BDF can claim to having participated in such missions is when it went into Lesotho with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (more than two decades ago). Concurrently poaching in Botswana has escalated and border security has not improved. Maybe this is becauseitlackstherequisitelightand highlymobileforces aconsequenceofits acquisitionprocessesfailingtoprocurethe proper capabilities. Given the nature of its assigned missions (to act against non-state actors in poachers and peace enforcements operations) it could be assumed the BDF would opt for matched capabilities helicopter gunships armored personnel carriers communicationequipment andSpecialForces. Instead in the 1990s Botswana embarked on ambitious arms programs of heavy and slowColdWarrelics(tanks fighteraircraft and drawn-artillery). This led Martin Rupiya and Daniel Henk to retort African militaries lacktheplanningrequiredforarealisticassessment of their security environment and a serious effort to match means ends and ways to procurement decisions. Thus the BDF s order of battle is dominated by obsolete 1960-70s technol- ogy most countries retired at the end of the ColdWar optingformodernlighterand faster technologies. Two security writers PeterBatchelorandSusanWillet explained why the BDF made such a move years of economic growth enabled Botswana s leaders to purchase prestige symbols going against the current trend of disarmament and security cooperation of the region. There was no clear connection betweencapabilitiesacquiredandchallenges the country faced against poachers border security and aid to civil society and escalating demands for peacekeeping in the continent. This mismatch naturally invites questionsaboutthefocusandinfluences associated with force development. For a forcestructureandacquisitionprocessnot based on the security realities and expectations of the nation may render the BDF irrelevant as the country becomes frugal. zxxxx Deficient Policies and Strategic Defense Management Framework The rapid development of the BDF from asingleriflecompanytothecurrentforce did not have corresponding formulation of defensepoliciesandstrategiestodefineits roles force levels and ways of sustainment. Policy makers neither kept abreast of the BDF s growth nor changing world events.Consequently theyfailedtopromulgaterequisitedefenselegislationand policies beyond creating a founding act. The BDF was formed out of and around the logical imperative of the time. It came out of a police branch hence it lacked a military history or strategic leadership experience. Thus it adopted a culture of expediency and tactical solutions at the expense of long term strategic planning. The Botswana Defence Force Act of 1977 as observed by R. Dale does very littletodefinetheconstructionandrole of the military. Apart from force employment privileges of the President and the Commander the BDF Act provides little guidance on the regulation of force size equipment andorganization. Under the section for the establishment and maintenance of the defense force the act merely states There shall be established and maintained in Botswana a force to be known as The Botswana Defence Force which shall consist of the Regular Force of the Defence Force and the Defence Force Reserve. Itsuggeststhebroademployment of the BDF as defence of Botswana and with such other duties as may from time to timebedeterminedbythePresident. Apart from referring to a Navy (in a landlocked Botswana) Air Force and Army in explanationof disciplinedforces theconstitution is silent on the construct of the military. This ambiguity and lack of strategic guidance led University of Botswana academic Dr Molomo to observe The reality of Botswana s defence policy is that there is no formalized structurebywhichitisformulated. The polity has a minute comprehension of the BDF s business capabilities and formations (or lack thereof) save for a few individuals in legislature and executive who served in the military before joining politics. Consequently developmentoftheBDF has been an evolution from within the rest of the government and the nation had insignificantinput. Published in 2013 Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi Glen Segell described it this way Parliament through its committee under the broad framework of separation of powers is constitutionally mandated to oversee the military. However as we indicated earlier a characteristic feature of Botswana s political system is the fusion of power. Invariably this state of affairs compromises parliament s effectiveness to perform its oversightfunction. Intheabsenceofspecificdefensemanagement policies the BDF largely depend on civil service legislation and general orders.Thislackofspecificguidanceforces it to functions as a regular civilian governmental department. This is unlike in other nations. For instance in the U.S. legislative articles (such as Title 10 United States Code) provide authority to determine size organization and directs civilian leadership to provide written policy guidance for military planning. Moreover in Botswana (as is the case in most of Africa) legislative debates and policy developments are muted bytheoverclassificationofinformationon military activities. According to Molomo On occasion the legislature has not been allowed to review the defense budget in its presentation in the National Assembly due tonationalsecurityconcerns. Thishasnotonlystifledmilitarylegislation and policy development but has perpetuated ignorance among legislators and festered misguided hostility to the military s fundingrequirements. In the 36 years of the BDF s existence Botswana has not carried out a defense review despite the dramatic end of the Cold 24 African Defense April May 2015 Waraswellasashiftinregionalpolitical and security circumstances. Development of the BDF has largely been an evolutionary internal patch-up process rather than through broader strategic guidance from the polity. The current move within the BDF to introduce brigade groupings is yet another self-induced change by the military without any legislative policy or doctrinal guidance. Like previous changes it is largely a copy-paste structure from the US (without appreciating the methods environment scale and experiences that informed brigade combat teams decision in the US) with no study to demonstrate its appropriateness to the country s defense needs military effectiveness or affordability. In the US every new administration has to produce a security strategy within thefirsttwoyearsofofficeandanyresulting transformation will be managed by their Department of Defense (DoD). Indeed other countries periodical carry out defense reviews to keep their militaries relevant both South Africa and the United Kingdom completed theirs in the past two years specificallyinresponsetotheendoftheCold Warandanincreaseinnon-stateconflicts. Similarly Botswana needs a review of its military to achieve its existing missions or thosedefinedbythereview.Thisre-organization should not be an internal BDF process it must be a national project because the people procure the military s capabilities through their elected representatives. As Clausewitz aptly states neither experts in politics or policy making nor expertsinfightingneednecessarilybeexperts instrategy. Majorstrategicdecisionsconcerning force development and employment are supposed to be a robust engagement between the polity and the military producing strategic guidance for the nation. Consequently policymakersshould considerprioritiesandequitiestoshape not only military strategy but the development of a broader national security strategy to guide all national security agencies. The Ministry of Defence Justice and Security (MDJS) has to provide strategic guidance to coordinate and facilitate the multiplicity of the country s security actors such as the police Special Support Group (SSG) and the Directorate of Intelligence Services (DIS) who like the BDF also possess substantial kinetic capabilities and coercive force. The ministry is aware of these shortcomings. In the opinion of the Minister of Defense Justice and Security this guidance will ef- fectively reduce the discrepancies redundanciesanddeficienciesinournational security policy implementation process. To this end the security institutions will be appropriately resourced to deliver the capabilitiesrequired. However it seems the MDJS is hamstrung by human capital to carry on this task normally the BDF has no more than twomiddlerankingofficersattheministry. In the US the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense (with a complement of over 3 000 civilian and military staff) are a platform for engagement between the military and politytodefinepolicyandsustainthearmed forces. The South Africans and the British have similar arrangements an integrated civilian military effort converts national resources into military capabilities with due regard to political military and economic dimensions. Botswana is not yet there in this top down approach to building military capabilities the MDJS does not have a robust defense management structure to inform policy plan force development and execute defenseacquisition.Deficientofthistype legislative and bureaucratic guidance the BDF s vision becomes an unrealistic internal exercise another part of a futile bottom African Defense April May 2015 25 up stove-piped approach to the country s security challenges lacking coordination and synergy with other national sources of power. Because of this practice the BDF s inventory has become a perfunctory capability to address every security challenge of a landlocked country surrounded by war tested dominant and more populous neighbors. zxxxx Acquisition System Unsuited To Address Military Peculiarities Furthermore the current procurement system does not address the needs ofthemilitary.Itlackstherequisitefocus making it vulnerable to competing interests of involved parties. Individuals within the military constitute one such interest party. Likewise in the absence of strategic focus commercialinterestsbecomeamajorinfluence. Many of the weapons systems within theBDFareclassicexamplesofanacquisition system improperly poised to deliver effective and sustainable capabilities of a professional prompt and decisive force. Thecurrentacquisitionsystemcontrasts sharply with international best practices where defense ministries provide management architecture and policies to convert militaryrequirementsintocapabilities. WithintheUS theDoDhasanexpansivedefenseacquisitionstructure(with policy documents such as Directive No. 5000.01). The UK Ministry of Defence has a CapabilitiesWorkingGroup(CWG)headed by the Chief of Logistics to produce a user requirementsdocumentandguidance. InSouthAfrica theiracquisitionrequirementsaredevelopedfromthedifferent services and approval of each program is donebytheArmamentAcquisitionCouncil the Secretary for Defence or other authority asrequiredbyrelevantlegislation.Infact the South Africans have a parastatal company with a mandated function to meet the needs of their security services for material as well as all aspects of defense technology research.InBotswana acquisitionfunded through monies obtained from the Botswana Consolidated Fund (including defense acquisition)mustconformtothePublicProcurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA) (Cap.42 8).ThePPADAistheequivalentof theFederalAcquisitionRegulation(1984) in the US it provides uniform policies and procedures for procurement of all goods and services by executive agencies within the federal government. Unlike in the US where additional guidancefordefenseacquisitionprograms isprovidedintheDoDFederalAcquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Botswana has not promulgated any additional legislation or regulations to addresses the peculiaritiesofmilitaryacquisition.TheMDJS has no management framework to guide the translation of military needs into sustainable capabilities. The military depends on guidance from the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) procedures (the mechanics of procurement) without validatingandprioritizingrequirements.The BotswanaDefenseForceacquiresmilitary capabilities in the same manner schools acquirebooks.Noadditionalregulations orprocessesensureacquisitionssecure freedom of action for the military future sustainability or forge strategic partnerships and alliances. Consequently itcomesasnosurprise when the inventory of the BDF is a medleyofequipmentfromallovertheworld. Interestingly no major capabilities come from our weapons exporting neighbor South Africa the economic lifeline of our country through the South African Customs Union (SACU) and our combat partner within the SADC standby brigade. In the absence ofspecificgovernmentpoliciestoaddress defenseacquisition theBDFisproneto influencesnotnecessarilyaimedatproviding appropriate and sustainable capabilities toitswarfighters. Aspreviouslysuggested amajorinfluence is the military. The military is a tribe which in the absence of regulation procures tofititsownculture.Toatankcommander only a tank can kill by another tank while a militaryaviatorwillintuitivelyoptforfighter jets irrespective of real national security needs to preserve their culture. As Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett opined organizational cultures are particularly strong and stark in military organizations where training and acculturation practices are pronounced individuals in tightly knit social groups are called upon to override even their instincts and organizational symbols are literally worn on one s sleeves. Theseculturaldesiresoftentake priority over military effectiveness sustainability and strategic logic. Consequently theBDFhasputlittle emphasis on forming strategic partnerships with the countries who provide their equipment concedingsustainabilityand freedomofaction.Becausetheirequipment comes from all corners of the globe it s purchased from obscure defense contractors whoarenotoriginalequipmentmanufacturers (OEM) and who can t secure a long term support commitment. Additionally the country s limited industrial base and lack of technical knowledge leaves the BDF at the mercy of these unscrupulous suppliers. Having accumulated unsuitable inventories the military sflexibilityislostasfundinggoes towardsmaintainingoutdatedequipment. Thecountry sweakdefenseacquisition system is also susceptible to manipulation andinfluencebybusinessinterests.Industry representatives can be anything from relatives of serving members retired military members to legislators. Parliament has repeatedly sought to know how BDF conducts itsbusiness(particularlyhowitidentifies majorequipmentsuppliers). However successive defense ministers have declined to go into details citing security reasons. Nor has the BDF explained its relationship with industry s middlemen. The code of conduct for these representatives is as elusive they apparently get rewarded basedonhowclosetheyaretoinfluence acquisitiondecisions orhowmuchinside informationtheyacquirefortheircompanies. In the absence of strategic guidance standards(technicalspecifications) ora robustacquisitionprocess theBDFiseasily swayed.Thesedefectsofdefenseacquisition can best be illustrated by the procurement of 14 Canadian-built CF-5 aircraft from representatives of the Canadian government in the 1990s. Like most weapon platforms the BDF acquiredatthetime theCF-5wasbought second hand. The strategic calculus of its purchase is neither apparent nor documented in the public domain. These CF-5A B models had far too many operational limitations to be employed as a modern tactical fighter. Consequently itremainsanineffective airsuperiorityfighter itisequallyineffective as a ground attack aircraft and lacks operational range when carrying a weapons load. Insightfully Royal Canadian Air Force pilots stated the CF-5 lacked all-weather navigationandattackcapabilities.Specifically it could not compete with the MiG-19 FarmerwhenthestandardfighterequipmentoftheWarsawPactwasthemore advanced MiG-21 Fishbed. Bought at a time when all Botswana s neighbors possessed aircraft superior to the MiG-19 Farmer the 26 African Defense April May 2015 CF-5 was an inapt answer to most of the BDF s missions. The operational radius of the aircraft limits its support to our troops soitcan treliablyprovidefiresupporttoa BDF peace-enforcement mission abroad. TheCF-5 likeotherCold-Wareraaircraft hasalargelogisticalfootprint itusesliquid oxygen an independent ground-power unit supplemental air for starting as well as othergroundsupportequipment. Additionally the aircraft has serious sustainment challenges. The OEM Canadair nolongermaintainsconfigurationcontrol for the CF-5 similarly Canadian Forces have no interest in its future. This has left the BDF at the mercy of unreliable private suppliers. Subsequently maintenanceisprovingtobe particularly debilitating for a landlocked low industrial base country with an extraordinarily demanding operational environment. Similar challenges are found across most major weapon platforms in the BDF inventory reduced effectiveness leads to lowoperationalavailability difficultiesin integrating hardware from different sources leadstoinadequatelogisticssupport.Thisis compounded by the country s low industrial base and inherent inability to maintain complexmilitaryequipment.Aproperdefense acquisitionsystemwouldhaverejected these weapon platforms before the BDF acquiredthem especiallyatatimewhenthe proponents of these systems were retiring them for lighter and faster capabilities. Botswana needs a sensitive defense acquisitionsystem whereoperational requirementscandictatethecapabilities acquiredandaministryofdefensethatcan provideanappropriatedefenseacquisition management platform. zxxxx Recommendations Clearly the BDF has outgrown the BDF Act reliance on civil service General Orders is reason enough to promulgate legislation and regulations that will cover more of BDF mandate and activities. There is need to have separate and distinct military statutes to address among other things authority on size organization and written policy guidance for military planning. Parliament to should be led on more into the development of the military as much as the President is responsible for its employment parliament should play a more active role in appropriating for and resourcing the military to ensure the country s secu- rity. This can only be realized if the military opens up more and is accountable to the legislators. A comprehensive security review is overdue for Botswana. Primarily to inform theroleandequipmentoftheBDFinthe current security climate of southern Africa and its missions relative to other security organs within the country. As the minister observed this will effectively reduce the discrepancies redundanciesanddeficiencies in our national security policy and security institutions will be appropriately resourced todeliverthecapabilitiesrequired The establishment of Ministry of Defence Justice and Security (MDJS) did not bring about expected level of involvement in defense management commensurate with world best practice for similar institutions.Theministryshouldconsiderbeefing up its staff with individuals knowledgeable of defense management. The ministry should take to both the executive and legislature proposals to stimulate defense policy formulation. To this end the ministry should have the structure and staff for developing defense policy and then translating approved policy into a long term plans and an acquisitionandbranchtoaddressdefense business. There is a need to take a further look into the current procurement system to accommodate and address the peculiarities of militaryacquisition aswellasrestorepublicconfidenceintheprocesses.Acquisition strategies should be put in place to emphasize standards as well as partnerships to ensuretheweaponsystemsacquiredare operationally and logistically sustainable. Policies should strengthen smart partnerships to pool resources and capabilities Botswana cannot afford on her own particularly with well-resourced South Africa shunning South Africa when our country s economy is tied to it is wasteful. An arrangement similar to what the Canadians have with the Americans can go a long way in complementing and saving costs for both countries. There is need to for the nation to haveconfidenceonhowdefensespending is done. The relationship the BDF has with industry should be as transparent as securityallows.Equipmentchoicesshould be a product of sound security assessment neither the military desires nor the industry influencesshouldprevailoverstrategicimperatives. Middlemen and companies in the securitybusinessneedspecificregulations perceptionsofundueinfluencearenotonly hurtful to the BDF image but undermine its effectiveness as well. Action should be taken to dispose of obsolete systems and their inordinate maintenance costs. Inventory which can t be broughttothefight nomatterhowimpressive on parade will not make the BDF s vision of a prompt professional and decisive force. Conclusion The Botswana Defence Force s vision cannot be realized under the current arrangement. There is lack of strategic focus and a defense management framework for matching its policies and resources to deliver appropriate capabilities. Botswana has been slow to promulgate legislation and develop policies to further definethemilitary spurpose guidetheacquisitionofitsequipment andexplainthe role the BDF must to play in the country s security enterprise. The military has largely relied on civil service policies and regulations withtheunintendedconsequenceof it becoming molded into a regular government department. This has been compounded by the continued assignment of the military to perform functions normally assigned to civil authorities. Consequently theBDFhascontinued to carry out internal restructuring and acquirecapabilitieswithoutimprovingitsoperational effectiveness while it is consistently assigned to act against non-state actors it hasacquiredthecapabilitiespredominantly requiredfortraditional state-to-stateCold Wareracombat.Thisisalsoduetoits vulnerability to competing interests not all of which are aimed at delivering appropriate capabilities to the BDF. Regardless the next big ticket purchases will not address the country s security concerns. A defense review is needed to establish the proper relationships between the people institutions and the military. Otherwise the BDF s vision statement shall remain aninconsequentialsoundbiteconfinedto the military barracks. To read an expanded version of this article complete with citations and notations send an email request to jeffm african-defense. com African Defense April May 2015 27 RosoboRonexpoRt state CoRpoRation 27 stRomynka stReet mosCow 107076 Russia www.RosoboRonexpoRt.Ru 7 495 534 61 83 7 495 534 61 53 Fax MODULAR ARGUMENTS It s no secret that today the use of remote controlled weapon stations or weapons platforms in combat vehicles is a global trend based on commanders desire to protect the crew from enemy weapon effects improve battlefield surveillance and increase the killing capabilities against a wide range of ground and air targets. Such means have become particularly relevant through the emergence of remote weapon control technologies and lessons learned from the tactics used by ground forces in today s armed conflicts. For example according to the U.S. Department of Defense in 2005-2006 alone their armed forces lost about 350 soldiers in exposed firing positions (who operated open turret mounts) in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact remote controlled weapon stations (RCWS) with light cannons came to be seen as a mandatory element ensuring the required firepower for most of existing armored vehicles from trucks to tanks. The reason is simple using the fire control system and without exposing himself to enemy fire or the risk of injury in vehicle rollovers the gunner can effectively provide fire support to reconnaissance escort and patrol units while remaining safely inside the vehicle. In recent years many arms manufacturers have been working on remote controlled weapon platforms. But it is precisely in Russia that truly effective RCWS have been developed capable of becoming a mainstay for significantly enhancing the combat capabilities of armored vehicles in service with armies of many countries in the world. By the way before remote weapon stations were developed weapons were housed inside the manned turret. However with such a layout achieving the required level of crew protection entails a significant increase in weight and moves the center of gravity upward which affects mobility of vehicles. At the same time the RCWS is free from this drawback which can be effectively used to improve protection of the hull where the crew is housed or carry additional equipment and ammunition. Modular design solutions implemented in Russian RCWS enable the use of 7.62 mm PKTM type and 12.7 mm Kord type machine guns as well as 30 mm 2A42 type automatic cannons as weapons. Cocking of weapons is remote electromechanical multiple. The weapon elevation and traverse angles are -10 to 75 deg and 360 deg. 28 Advertisement African Defense June 2014 Capability Profiles The automated gunner workstation is equipped with a plasma or LCD control panel with an integrated ballistic computer and a two-handed control console (or a one-handed joystick). The RCWS is equipped with a sight having television thermal imaging and distance measuring channels. Enhanced accuracy of a heavy machine gun achieved through two-plane weapon stabilization provides assured target kill with the first burst while an improved image display system enables target reconnaissance acquisition and tracking before opening fire. Communication between the fire control system and the vehicle s information and control system can be provided via RS-485 Ethernet and CAN channels while video transmission--via the HD-SDI (SMPTE 292) and Ethernet channels. In general the Russian RCWS can be divided into three categories according to weight--light (up to 300 kg) medium (up to 650 kg) and heavy (up to 1 500 kg). They are self-contained platforms and every customer can simply select the required type of modules. The modular principle also makes it possible to quickly upgrade the RCWS. Unarmored machine-gun RCWS weighing up to 300 kg are designed for installation on armored cars command vehicles support vehicles or fixed facilities. They offer the ammo box change capability without people leaving the vehicle. For command vehicles and other automotive and tracked platforms machinegun RCWS weighing up to 650 kg have been devised. They carry an additional remote surveillance TV camera to expand the observation capabilities. Machine-gun and machine-gun cannon RCWS weighing up to 1 500 kg are designed to be mounted on lightly armored wheeled and tracked vehicles. Their armor protection complies with NATO STANAG 4569 Level 2 or 3. The modules can carry smoke screening and other systems. The capability to control fire from two stations is their major advantage. The module s armament includes a 30mm automatic cannon and a 7.62 mm machine gun with 300 30 mm rounds and 1 000 7.62 mm rounds respectively. The sighting and observation system used in the new Russian weapon module meets all modern requirements imposed not only in Russia but in other countries as well. The system includes observation and sighting TV cameras a thermal sight and a laser rangefinder. In addition to all the basic functions related to preparation for fire and fire a fire control system installed in the RCWS ensures operation in automatic target tracking mode. This greatly increases the likelihood of engaging a moving when the vehicle moves over rough terrain. Moreover the dependence of target accuracy of the proficiency of a gunner operating the RCWS decreases. Unlike most of foreign counterparts having no or insufficient ballistic protection Russian RCWS offer ballistic protection matching that of the platform on which the module is installed. Rosoboronexport Russia s sole state special exporter of the whole range of defense and dual-use products services and technologies is proud to offer its partners high-performance and versatile Russian remote controlled weapon stations. Arms market experts recognize that these modules consisting of 100 percent Russian components are very attractive today not only because they have a better price but also due to the fact that there is no dependence on suppliers from other countries if they are ordered. This is also an argument. African Defense April May 2015 Advertisement 29 Growing Challenges of Peace and Security in Africa Continued from page 19 consolidating Ghana s rich experiences in the conduct of elections. IamhappytosaythatWestAfricanow counts very successful elections that make us to hope for a better democratic future. Ghana Sierra Leone Benin Cape Verde Senegal have all been cited as success stories in free fair and transparent democratic elections with power alternating from one party to another. I salute the maturity of the electorate in these countries and the men and women who have handled the electoral institutions including the electoral commissions. Permit me to pay tribute to these courageousandprofessionalofficerswho have continued to write the name of Africa ingoldenprints.TheECOWASelectoral unit and the team of observers civil society and other partners and stakeholders have contributed in no less manner in successful electionsinWestAfrica. Meanwhile in the northeastern part of thecountry thebrutalconflictwithBoko Haramhasbeenonforfiveyearsandhas had a devastating impact on the lives of civilians thousands of which have been murdered or displaced inside and outside thecountry.Thecrisisquicklyspreadto neighboringwithdevastatingconsequences in some of them. Whilediscussionsoveramultinational military force are still ongoing Nigeria has been joining forces with its neighbors since the beginning of February and mobilized a long-needed military offensive to stop the insurgency from committing atrocities against local populations. For now Boko Haram has been pushed out of their strongholds but attacks still occur and a regional humanitarian crisis with over a million displaced people is still left largely unaddressed with no current perspectives for a return. As we strive to addressthesecuritydeficienciesthathave given rise to Boko Haram and similar terrorist groups and alleviate their humanitarian consequences wemustremainmindfulthat they do not exist in a vacuum but nourished by weak state institutions ungoverned spaces political neglect and the rampant poverty that drives people into desperation. I have just completed a tour of the Boko Haram affected countries plus Benin with my colleague SRSG for Central Africa which took us to Yaounde N Djamena Cotonou Abuja and Niamey. Countries assessed that defeating Boko Haram is within their reach. Boko Haram attacks have reducedsignificantlyfollowingthevigorous action taken by Nigeria and its neighbors during the past few weeks but we are not yet out of the woods. Challenges remain to be addressed properly and urgently with regardtocoordinationoftheirfightandthe fundingrequired.Nigeriaisexpectedto live up to its responsibility and put in more efforts under the new government. But other governments need to understand the huge stakesinvolvedinthefightagainstBoko Haram by standing together to face this menace and especially allowing hot pursuit across common borders. The marginalization underdevelopment and humanitarian crisis brought about need to be tackled. Already reflectiononwhatneedstobedone for the post-Boko Haram era is underway. In this connection I would like to underscore the somehow related phenomenon of migration and say that it has always been disheartening watching television images of Africans drowning in boats in the Mediterranean waters or jumping barbwires to reach Europe at all cost. Only this week we have been reminded of the dangers faced by thousands of youth risking their lives to cross the Sahara and the Mediterranean to enter Europe. WestAfricafacesamultitudeofpeace andsecuritychallenges.Itwillrequirefull attention and combined efforts to prevent violence and political instability in this region. Let me also state here that peace and security are attained by collective effort even if we all have the understanding that the responsibility for global peace and security lies with the United Nations while at the level of member states it is the government s role to protect its citizens. In this regard it is worth noting that Africa took a major step with the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in 2000 which provides a normative framework for an intervention of the continental body in case of grave violation of human rights for instance thus bridgingthegapbetween non-interference and non-indifference. Thesubsequent African Architecture for Peace and Security whichstretchesfrompreventionofconflict topost-conflictreconstructionandpeacebuilding as well as the Charter on democ- racy electionsandgovernance areequally noticeable. Atregionallevel ECOWAShashad a vanguard role as indeed it put in place a normative set up starting with the declaration of political principles as early as in 1991. This was followed less than a decade later by the protocol relating to the mechanismforconflictprevention management resolution peacekeeping and security of 1999. The two instruments were further enhanced by the protocol on democracy and good governance of 2001. Learning from past experience of interventions to bring peace and security to countriesinWestAfrica ECOWASrealized the need for a paradigm shift towards conflictprevention.Basedonexisting protocols particularly the Protocol Relating totheMechanismforConflictPrevention Management Resolution Peacekeeping and Security of 1999 (also known as the Mechanism) and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001 ECOWASanditspartnershavedeployed efforts aimed at operationalizing the early warning system in accordance with Chapter IV of the Mechanism. Emphasis on early warning and early response was intended to underscore the importance of prevention of violentconflictsbothatthestructuraland operational levels and the adoption of the ECOWASConflictPreventionFrameworkin January 2008 is proof of the determination ofWestAfricanleaderstoworkproactively toavertorpreventviolentconflicts.Efforts atestablishingtheECOWASStandbyForce that draws from the famous ECOMOG experience is an indicator of a strong resolve and collective political will. Nevertheless the UN should continue to help build their capacity and consolidate theclosepoliticalintegrationinWestAfrica. Wemustalsodomoretoengagewiththe living voices in these societies and help build and improve civil society-driven conflictpreventionandresolutionmechanisms throughout the region. Topreventabackslideintoconflictand disorder in countries that are still in fragile recovery we as a region must not lose sight of providing the necessary support to diplomatic and political mediation ensuring free and fair elections and implementing security sector reform and efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime. Wecannotallowourselvestoforgetthat preventionofconflictremainsapressing priorityinWestAfrica. 30 African Defense April May 2015 AfricAn Defense Updated Daily Focus on People Technologies Are you reading New Industry AfricA s Present AfricA s future Innovations Key Leadership Insights Promoting Regional Alliances Understanding International Partnerships Find Opportunities Events For more details contact Jeff McKaughan jeffm ry er ing lita Oth r v Mi o Se ican ike N n r L o Af nal cati the ssio ubli ofe P Pr African Defense April May 2015 31 From the battlefield to border security operations Exelis provides powerful customized C4ISR solutions. Follow Exelis Exelis is a registered trademark and The Power of Ingenuity is a trademark both of Exelis Inc. Copyright 2014 Exelis Inc. All rights reserved. Image courtesy of DVIDS and the USMC. 32 African Defense April May 2015